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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of personal liberty." 25 When the F. B. I. began tapping intrastate
communications it was held that these things were within the scope of
the Federal Communications Act.
The New York State Constitution permits the tapping of wires s. 2
The question arises, whether or not this state constitutional provision
violates the Federal Communications Act. There has been no deci-
sion either way but it is submitted that it would be considered viola-
tive in interstate communications.
Where federal agents placed a detectaphone against a partition
wall of an office in which members of a conspiracy engaged in conver-
sations among themselves and over the telephone, evidence of con-
versations obtained by the use of the detectaphone was not inadmis-
sible on the ground that the use of the detectaphone violated the
Fourth Amendment, since it was not a violation of the home, the
detectaphone being placed on the outside.
27
In spite of the direction taken by the development of the law of
search and seizure the interception of telephone and telegraphic com-
munications should be sustained during a.period of war. All mea-
sures necessary and proper to aid Congress in carrying into effect the
determination of Congress to wage war would necessarily be sustained.
RosE KRAUS.
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF EQUITY DECREES-FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE
A recent decision 1 brought into prominence the applicability of
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution 2 to foreign
decrees.3 A sues B for specific performance in State X, and A ob-
tains therein a decree over land in State Y. To what extent must
State Y recognize the decree rendered in State X ? 4 This has been
the subject of much discussion and theorization among legal authori-
25 Ibid.
28 N. Y. CoNssT. Art. I, § 12 (1938). The Constitution of 1938 does not
change the rule that even though evidence in a criminal case is obtained in vio-
lation of law, it is not thereby rendered inadmissible. People v. La Combe, 170
Misc. 669, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 871 (1939).
27 Goldman v. United States, 62 Sup. Ct. 993, aff'g, United States v. Gold-
man, 118 F. (2d) 310, certiorari denied, 61 Sup. Ct 1109, 1111, 313 U. S. 1588,
85 L. ed. 1543 (1941).
1 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 189, 63 Sup. Ct. 207
(1942).
2 U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
3 An order of a court as distinguished from a common law judgment for
money.
4 The law relating to the applicability of the full faith and credit clause as
to common law judgments is well-settled.
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ties.5 The abundant material on the subject is understandable when
one realizes the mutational quality of judicial decisions pertaining to
the extraterritorial recognition of equity decrees. As an integral part
of this problem, the construction to be placed on the full faith and
credit clause has been the object of much divergent opinion. For this
discussion, decrees may be classified approximately into five main'
groupings: land, mortgages, money, receivership, and divorces. And
upon their extraterritorial validity will depend not only determina-
tions as to property, but also as to personal status, as in marital issues.
Land Decrees
Land decrees alone have enjoyed the enviable reputation of ex-
treme popularity- among legal analysts.8 Each state is reluctant to
relinquish jurisdiction over property within its own territory and this
aversion is indicated by a refusal to recognize a change in ownership
procured by the foreign decree alone.7 But what recognition will
such decree affecting title to real property be given? Although seven
theories have been advanced, two of them seem to embrace the other
five in scope. One authority expounded the proposition that foreign
land decrees are recognized only as a matter of comity and that the
full faith and credit clause does not apply.8 This position must be
modified in the face of innumerable decisions on the subject. The
prevailing opinion is that where the court has jurisdiction of the par-
ties, although not of the subject matter (i.e., the land), the decree
there entered will be declared res judicata on the facts and entitled to
full faith and credit as evidentiary matter by the court of the sitgs.
But the limitation is that there be a pre-existing obligation between
the parties.9 In fact, Pound, an eminent authority, even claims that
it is not necessary to assert one's rights under a decree in a foreign
state where there is a pre-existing right upon which the decree is
based.10  In Fall v. Eastin, the plaintiff is suing on a Washington
5 But it is established law that tll foreign decrees, even those for money,
may be attacked collaterally on two grounds: fraud and non-jurisdiction of the
court entering the decree. Accord, Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156 (1854).
6 CHAFEE, SIMPSON AND MA.OWNY, CASES ON EQUITY (1939) 101.
7 "A court of chancery, acting in personam, may well decree the convey-
ance of land in any other State, and may enforce their decree by process against
the defendant. But neither the decree itself, nor any conveyance under it,
except by the person in whom the title is vested, can operate beyond the juris-
diction of the court." Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25, 57, 10 L. ed. 25 (U. S.
1842).8 See WALiSH, A TREATIsE ON EQm2ry (1930) 71.
9 Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 65 (1909); Massie v. Watts, 6
Cranch 148 (U. S. 1810); Young v. Farwell, 165 N. Y. 341, 59 N. E. 143
(1901); Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 115 (1871) ; cf. Schofield, Full Faith
and Credit v. Comity and Local Rules of Jurisdiction and Decision (1905) 10
ILL. L. Rxv. 11.
10 "But in equity the suit is to compel defendant to do his duty, and that
duty is not necessarily merged in the decree, so that if the decree fails of effect,
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decree awarding her in a divorce action the title to land situated in
Nebraska. The Supreme Court, in sustaining Nebraska's refusal to
enforce the decree, asserted that the constitutional provision "only
makes the judgment rendered conclusive on the merits of the claim or
subject-matter of the suit."" Holmes concurred specially in that
decision on the ground that a decree rendered in a court that has
jurisdiction of the parties becomes a personal obligation of the defen-
dant that is subject to enforcement in any other state.' 2 But this is
a proper subject for objection by those who declare that the courts of
the situs would be rubber-stamping the findings of a court having no
jurisdiction over the res.1' Whether or not a pre-existing obligation
is necessary to apply the full faith and credit clause to the foreign land
decree, a substantial number of cases hold that where there is proper
jurisdiction of the parties, the foreign decree will be entered as evi-
dence and considered as res judicata of the facts. 1 4  It should be noted
that in all cases reviewed, a proper jurisdiction of the parties is con-
sidered necessary. And in Froelich v. Swafford,'5 the court declared
that the decree merely established a chose in action, or personalty,
since it does not act on title to property directly. As a result, the
court asserted that in order to acquire jurisdiction over the parties,
there must be personal service on the non-resident. This proposition
is established even further in Hart v. Samson.'6
an action may still be brought upon plaintiff's legal right, if he has one. There
was never any necessity for proceeding subsequently on a theory of enforcing
the decree rather than the original claim." Pound, The Progress of the Law,
1918-1919: Equity (1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 420, 424.11215 U. S. 1, 12, 54 L. ed. 65 (f909), cited supra note 9.
12 See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, 14, 54 L. ed. 65 (1909). "If the defen-
dant is personally served before a court of equity, the court has power to order
him to convey foreign land. Such a decree is an effective judgment and deter-
mines conclusively his obligation to convey and this obligation remains binding
upon the person of the defendant wherever found. Such a decree ought to be
entitled to full faith and credit at the situs of the land. Normally the decree
will be made to effectuate some antecedent equity, growing out of trust or
contract. But the constitutional effect of the decree should be independent of
the ground upon which it is made, for a personal decree is equally within the
competence of a court which has the defendant within its power, whatever
its ground, and however erroneous." Barbour, The Extraterritorial Effect of
the Equitable Decree (1919) 17 MIcH. L. Rv. 527, 532; accord, Messner, The
Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts
Outside the Territorial ,Limits of the State (1930) 14 MINN. L. Ray. 494.
13 See WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQuirY (1930) 69.
14 Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N. W. 127 (1919); Burnley v.
Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873) (due to the full faith and credit clause of
the Federal Constitution, decrees of a foreign state are valid as a cause of
action or ground of defense in the state of the situs and are regarded "as con-
clusive of all the rights and equities which were adjudicated and settled therein,
unless it be impeached for fraud") ; accord, Redwood Investment Co. v. Exley,
64 Cal. App. 455, 221 Pac. 973 (1923); Mallette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415,
160 N. W. 182 (1916); Note (1912) 25 HA.v. L. REv. 653.
15 35 S. D. 35, 150 N. W. 893 (1914).
16 110 U. S. 151, 28 L. ed. 101 (1884).
"Of course a court cannot pronounce a judgment or decree, that will




The law applicable to foreign mortgage decrees is well-settled.17
A foreign decree of foreclosure alone cannot bind the property situ-
ated in the state where enforcement is sought."' As Walsh clearly
states, "Such a decree undoubtedly would not be recognized or en-
forced by the courts of the situs anywhere today, as it is obvious that
the action is really in ren, although in personam as a matter of mere
form. Of course the court could compel the defendant to execute an
instrument releasing or conveying his equity to the mortgagee, which
would be valid and effective anywhere, but the mere decree would
have no effect on the land by action in- the courts of the situs." 19
Courts have held that this compulsory transfer of the title must be
made by the mortgagor or his agent in order to be effective in the
courts of the situs.2° Obviously, such a decree operates in personam
and there must be a proper jurisdiction of the parties in the foreign
state.2 ' But the foreign decree may be considered res judicata of the
facts where there was no compulsory transfer by the mortgagor if
any force or effect whatever beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, upon other than personal service of process."
17 CHAFEE, SIMPSON AND MALONEY, CASES ON EQUITY (1939) 107.
18 "The courts of our state will not recognize the rights of courts in other
states to affect directly the title to real estate in the former." Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Postal Tel. Co. et al., 55 Conn. 334, 11 AtI. 184, 185 (1887).
See Lynde v. Columbus, C. & I. C. Ry. et al., 57 Fed. 993 (1893) ; The Eaton
and Hamilton R. R. v. Hunt et al., 20 Ind. 457 (1863); Lindley v. O'Reilly, 50
N. J. L. 636, 15 Atl. 379 (1888); Pittsburgh & St. L. R. Co.'s Appeal, 4 Atl.
385 (Pa. 1886).19 See WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930) 77, n.20.
20 "Where, however, it is sought by the decree to effect a transfer of the
title to land lying within another jurisdiction, by directing its sale by a master,
who is not clothed with the title, the decree in such case operates upon the
thing, and does not divest the title of the owner; the master being, as we have
seen, a mere representative of the court, not under the control of either party,
nor the agent of either to make the sale." Guarantee Trust & Safe-Deposit
Co. v. Delta & Pine-Land Co. et al., 104 Fed. 5, 10 (1900). See Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Postal Tel. Co. et al., 55 Conn. 334, 11 At. 184, 185 (1887);
Union Trust Co. v. Olmsted, 102 N. Y. 729, 7 N. E. 872 (1886); Mead v.
Brockner, 82 App. Div. 480, 81 N. Y. Supp. 594 (2d Dep't 1903); People v.
American Loan & T. Co., 62 Hun 622, 17 N. Y. Supp. 76 (1891) ; cf. Muller v.
Dows, 94 U. S. 444 (1876). But cf. Eaton v. McCall, 86 Me. 346, 29 Atl. 1103.
(1894) ; Richard v. Boyd, 124 Mich. 396, 83 N. W. 106 (1900) ; Hammond v.
Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 Pac. 148 (1918); Widmann v. Hammock, 110 Wash.
77, 187 Pac. 1091 (1920).
21 "It is here undoubtedly a recognized doctrine that a court of equity, sit-
ting in a State and having jurisdiction of the person, may decree a conveyance
by him of land in another State, and may enforce the decree by process against
the defendant" Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 449 (1876); see Guarantee
Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Delta & Pine-Land Co. et al., 104 Fed. 5, 10(C. C. A. 5th, 1900); Lamkin v. Lovell, 176 Ala. 334, 58 So. 258 (1912);
Ft. Wayne Trust Co. v. Sihler, 34 Ind. App. 147, 72 N. E. 494 (1904) ; Kirdahi
v. Basha, 36 Misc. 715, 74 N. Y. Supp. 383 (1902); Smith v. Fletcher, 102
Wash. 218, 173 Pac. 19 (1908). Contra: Union Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank,
155 Mo. 95, 55 S. W. 989 (1900).
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there was jurisdiction over the parties.22 The rule as to chattel mort-
gages is firmly established by Hall v. Miligan, wherein it is stated'
that a chattel mortgage is a transitory cause of action within the
jurisdiction of the court of any state, "when the defendant has been
locally found and served, although both parties are at the time domi-
ciliary residents of the foreign state" and the chattel is not situated in
the courts of the state entering the decree.23
Money Decrees
As for foreign money decrees and receivership, the law needs
scant discussion due to its unquestionable certainty. McKim v. Odom
renders a concise statement of the law applicable to money decrees.
"If such a decree be conclusive between the parties, in the state where
it was rendered, if the court had jurisdiction, the parties were heard,
and nothing of irregularity or fraud appears, or is even suggested to
vitiate the proceedings, it is not easy to perceive why a decree emanat-
ing from the highest tribunal in the state is not entitled to as much
respect and consideration as a judgment of a subordinate court of
law." 24 The decree is entitled to full faith and credit as conclusive
proof of the amount due.2 5  But, in order to effect execution in the
state where enforcement is sought, it must be made a judgment in
that state.20  In order for the full faith and credit clause to operate
towards recognition of the foreign decree, there must be jurisdiction
over the parties in the state where it was rendered.
2 7
Receiverships
A receiver is considered an officer of the court appointing him
and his powers are coextensive with those of the court making the
22 Belmont v. Cornen, 48 Conn. 338 (1880); Overlander v. Overlander
et at., 125 Kan. 386, 265 Pac. 46 (1928); Clark v. Eltinge, 38 Wash. 376, 80
Pac. 556 (1905) ; Frank v. Snow, 6 Wyo. 42, 42 Pac. 484 (1895).
23 221 Ala. 233, 128 So. 438, 439 (1930).
24 12 Me. 94 (1835). As stated also in Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65
(U. S. 1853), "We lay it down, therefore, as the general rule, that in every
instance in which an action of debt can be maintained upon a judgment at law
for a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the like action can be main-
tained upon a decree in equity which is for an ascertained and specific amount
See Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines 22 (N. Y. 1805).
25 See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1910) ; Smith v. Cowell, 41 Colo.
178, 92 Pac. 20 (1907); Harrington v. Harrington, 154 Mass. 517, 28 N. E.
903 (1891); cf. Du Bois v. Seymour, 152 Fed. 600 (C. C. A. 3d, 1907).
See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908) (Mississippi was compelled to
recognize a Missouri money judgment although it was granted on a gambling
debt, an illegal and void contract in Mississippi).
26 Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N. J. Eq. 306, 49 At. 501 (1901).
27 See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 346 (1913). As for foreign




appointment. 28  He is not entitled to recognition in the courts of
other states under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Con-
stitution, but may be so recognized as a matter of comity, provided it
does not contravene the public policy of the state where recognition is
sought, nor operate to the injury of its citizens 2 9 Such a receiver
has no enforceable right to property in another state on the basis of
his appointment alone, 30 but by principles of comity, he may be per-
mitted to acquire jurisdiction over the property, subject to the rights
of domestic creditors and to the public policy of the state of the
forum.3 '
Divorces
The issues involved in other foreign equity decrees are present in
the problem of the extraterritorial validity of foreign divorces. To
exhaust all these phases of the subject is not within the purview of
this article. But due to the decision of the Supreme Court in Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, the applicability of the full faith and credit
clause to divorces has assumed importance as a controversial issue.
The Williams case involves four parties: A married to B; C married
to D. The two couples were married and domiciled in North Caro-
lina until May, 1940, when A and D went to Reno and procured
divorces from their respective spouses after establishing a six-weeks
28 "A receiver is an officer of the court that appoints him. His power does
not extend beyond that of the court which gives him his official character."
Choctaw Coal & Mining Co. et al. v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 75 Ark
365, 87 S. W. 632 (1905). See Great Western Mining & Manufacturing Co. v.
Harris, 198 U. S. 561 (1905); Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854) (a
receiver is not an agent of the plaintiff or the defendant, but of the court) ;
Chapman v. First Nat Bank of Seattle et al., 37 F. (2d) 105 (S. D. N. Y.
1929); Hirning v. Hamlin, 200 Iowa 1322, 206 N. W. 617 (1925) ; Oklahoma
Sheep, etc., Co. v. Hastings, 80 Okla. 109, 194 Pac. 223 (1920).2 9 See Mahon v. Ongley Electric Co., 156 N. Y. 196, 50 N. E. 805 (1898);
Dyer v. Power, 60 Hun 583, 14 N. Y. Supp. 873 (1891); Choctaw Coal &
Mining Co. et al. v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 75 Ark. 365, 87 S. W.
632 (1905).
30 "He has no extra-territorial power of official action; none which the
court appointing him can confer, with authority to enable him to go into a
foreign jurisdiction to take possession of the debtor's property . . ." Booth v.
Clark, 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854). See Abm. S. See & Depew, Inc. v. Fisheries
Products Co. et al., 9 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Bullock v. Oliver, 155
Ga. 151, 116 S. E. 293 (1923).
31 "A receiver, therefore, appointed in one state, though he has no title to)roperty located in another state simply by virtue of his appointment, may by
comity be permitted to take or recover the possession of property in another
state, provided no citizen or suitor of the latter state is thereby prejudiced or
ignored, and no public policy of the latter state is violated." Continental Oil
Co. v. American Co-Op. Ass'n et al., 31 Wyo. 433, 228 Pac. 503 (1924). See
Wheeler et al. v. Badenhausen Co., 260 Fed. 991 (E. D. Pa. 1919); Lewis et al.
v. American Naval Stores Co., 119 Fed. 391 (E. D. La. 1902); Mahon v. The
Ongley Electric Co., 156 N. Y. 196, 50 N. E. 805 (1898); Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. Burns, 17 Ga. App. 1, 86 S. E. 270 (1915).
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residence as required by Nevada law. A and D married each other
after obtaining the divorces and returned to North Carolina, which
state instituted bigamy proceedings against them on the ground that
the Nevada divorces were invalid and not entitled to recognition in
North Carolina. North Carolina convicted the defendant on the
basis of Haddock v. Haddock.32  But the Supreme Court, in revers-
ing the North Carolina decision, overruled Haddock v. Haddock. In
the latter case, the New York court refused to recognize a decree
obtained by the husband in Connecticut on the ground that there was
no personal service on the defendant wife in New York, nor did she
enter an appearance in the divorce proceedings. A further reason for
refusing recognition of the Connecticut decree was founded on the
fact that the husband had wrongfully left the marital domicile estab-
lished in New York, and as the court stated, "Where the domicil of
matrimony was in a particular state, and the husband abandons his
wife and goes into another state, in order to avoid his marital obliga-
tions, such other state to which the husband has wrongfully fled does
not, in the nature of things, become a new domicil of matrimony, and
therefore, is not to be treated as the actual or constructive domicil of
the wife; hence the place where the wife was domiciled when so aban-
doned constitutes her legal domicil until a new domicil be by her
elsewhere acquired." 33 In effect, the Williams case is not as far-
reaching or as innovating as one might suspect by a cursory reading.
At least the New York courts have limited it to deciding that a wrong-
fully absent spouse may establish a bona fide domicile in another state
than the matrimonial one sufficient to give the foreign state the right
to enter a decree entitled to full faith and credit in other states.34 In
a leading article on the subject,3 5 the author expounded the theory that
it was entirely unnecessary for the Supreme Court to overrule the
Haddock case, since there was fraudulent intent in establishing the
domicile in Nevada. But an objection to this contention is that the
Attorney-General of North Carolina admitted that there was enough
evidence to indicate that the defendant in the bigamy action had prob-
32201 U. S. 562, 50 L. ed. 867 (1905).
33 Id. at 570.
34 "The policy enumerated in Lefferts v. Lefferts (263 N. Y. 131) requires
the courts of this state to pass upon the bona fides of the residence of divorcees.
That policy was not impaired in the Williams case, which expressly reserved the
question whether the courts of one state might refuse to recognize the findings
of the courts of another state as to domicile. All that the majority purported
to do in the Williams case was to overrule Haddock v. Haddock (201 U. S.
562) and to remove from the question of full faith and credit consideration of
the subsidiary question whether the person who had removed from the matri-
monial domicile had wrongfully done so. The Supreme Court in the Williams
case did not eliminate domicile as a foundation for jurisdiction." Matter of
Brogan, App. Div., 2d Dep't, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 4, 1943. See McCarthy v.
McCarthy, Kings County Supreme Court, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 4, 1943; Jiranek v.
Jiranek, Westchester Supreme Court, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 28, 1943; Schnabel v.
Schnabel, New York County Supreme Court, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 10, 1943.
35Burns, Two Nevada Divorces Get Full Faith and Credit (1943) 29
A. B. A. J. 125 passim.
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ably been domiciled in Nevada.36 If North Carolina had submitted
the question of intent, a contrary finding by the Supreme Court might
have been reached.
87
Let us assume that the errant husband honestly intended to
establish a domicile in Nevada and could legally do so. How can we
overcome the objection to the full faith and credit clause applying to
the divorce decree when there was merely service by publication on
the defendant who had remained in the marital domicile? A divorce
action has both in rem and in personam characteristics. 38  In the
former, the question of marital domicile is involved and jurisdiction
of the res becomes the problem. In the latter, there is the question
of jurisdiction over the parties. It has been held that where the court
of the state granting the divorce does not have jurisdiction over the
res, in order that the full faith and credit clause apply to the decree,
there must be personal service or appearance by the defendant to
establish jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.3 9  It is true
that the court of the state of marital situs may recognize a decree
involving constructive service on the defendant by principles of com-
ity.40 But this has not been held a compulsory obligation.
It seems that the most fault-finding error lies in the admission
by the Attorney-General of North Carolina in the Williams case that
38 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 189, 63 Sup. Ct. 207,
209 (1942).
37 Id. at 210.
38 "The subject of jurisdiction in divorce proceedings is sui generis, and
partakes of the characteristics both of actions in personam and actions in rern,
more closely resembling the latter than the former." In re Bennett's Estate,
135 Misc. 486, 238 N. Y. Supp. 723, 732 (1929).
39 "A divorce decree rendered in a state where the plaintiff in the case is
domiciled, but the defendant is not, where the defendant is not personally served
with process and does not appear, is not entitled to extraterritorial recognition
under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States."
Beckwith v. Bailey, 119 Fla. 316, 161 So. 576, 580 (1935). See Davis v. Davis,
305 U. S. 32 (1938); Maloney v. Maloney, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 334 (1924);
Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940); Ackerman v.
Ackerman, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192 (1910); Olmsted v. Olmsted, 190 N. Y.
458, 83 N. E. 569 (1908).
"The process of courts run only within the jurisdiction which issued them.
They cannot be served without the jurisdiction, and courts of one state cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the citizens of another state under statutes which
authorize a substituted service . . . as to authorize a judgment in personam
against the party proceeded against" Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 424, 15
N. E. 707 (1888).
40 "The constructive service of process pursuant to the laws of the state of
Nevada conferred jurisdiction on the courts of that state to dissolve the mar-
riage contract at the instance of the husband, who was then lawfully domiciled
within that state, and the decree became valid and binding within that state,
and although it is not binding and-valid in other states as a matter of right,
under the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution, still it may be
recognized in other states by comity." Ball v. Cross, 190 App. Div. 711, 180
N. Y. Supp. 434, 435 (lst Dep't 1920). See Kraskin v. Kraskin, 104 F. (2d)
218 (D. C. 1939) ; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508 (1920) ;
In re Caltabellotta's Will, 183 App. Div. 753, 171 N. Y. Supp. 82 (4th Dep't
1918); Beckwith v. Bailey, 119 Fla. 316, 161 So. 576 (1935).
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there may be sufficient evidence of an established domicile in Nevada
by the husband. Whether the Supreme Court should have taken this
statement as conclusive proof of established domicile is itself question-
able. 41  Certainly, in the case, the least that can be said is that the
intent of the husband to establish the Nevada domicile is colorable, if
not fraudulent. And previous decisions on this issue establish the
law unquestionably to be that the court of the matrimonial situs may
enter into this question of intent 42 and if there is fraud therein estab-
lished, the full faith and credit clause will not apply to decrees so
obtained.43 But the full faith and credit clause will compel recogni-
tion of the foreign divorce where there was jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter.44  And it is the party who contests the valid-
ity of the decree who has the burden of overcoming the presumption
of its validity.45  It is established even further that in the state of
marital domicile, service by publication on the absent spouse in a
divorce action there brought will be sufficient to create jurisdiction
over the parties if in accordance with the laws of that state.46
It is evident that the underlying cause for the attempt on the part
of states to limit the applicability of the full faith and credit clause is
the desire to maintain their individual sovereignty. The Williams
case took a step forward in extending the constitutional clause to a
number of cases never before encompassed within its mandatory pro-
vision. Whether this is the best method of obtaining uniformity in
divorce laws is questionable. The Supreme Court itself recognized a
strong objection to its decision.47  The rebuttal of the Court to the
41BuMs, supra note 35, at 126.
42 "It is firmly established that, where the full faith and credit clause is
relied upon to compel the enforcement in one state of a decree rendered in
another, the facts essential to the jurisdiction of the court granting the decree
may be contradicted." Commonwealth v. Cronhardt, 127 Pa. Super. 269, 193
Atl. 484, 486 (1937).
43 See Campbell v. Campbell, 164 Misc. 647, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 619 (1937);
Parnham v. Parnham, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 93, 89 P. (2d) 189 (1939) ; Cardinale
v. Cardinale, 68 P. (2d) 351 (Cal. 1937); Perlman v. Perlman, 113 N. J. Eq.
3, 165 Atl. 646 (1933); Feickert v. Feickert, 98 N. J. Eq. 444, 131 Atl. 576(1926).44 See Drummond v. Lynch, 82 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ; Hall v.
Hall, 139 App. Div. 120, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1056 (1st Dep't 1910); Guggenheim
v. Wahl, 138 App. Div. 269, 122 N. Y. Supp. 941 (1st Dep't 1910); Strauss v.
Strauss, 122 App. Div. 729, 107 N. Y. Supp. 842 (1st Dep't 1907); Common-
wealth v. Cronhardt, 127 Pa. Super. 269, 193 At. 484, 488 (1937).
45 "However, the foreign decree, regular on its face is entitled to a pre-
sumption of validity, and the burden is upon the party attacking it." Cardinale
v. Cardinale, 68 P. (2d) 351, 353 (1937). See Feickert v. Feickert, 98 N. J.
Eq. 444, 451, 131 Atl. 576 (1926).
46 "But in order to make a divorce valid even when granted by the courts
of the State of the matrimonial domicile, there must be notice to the defendant,
either by service of process, or (if the defendant be a non-resident) by such
publication or other constructive notice as is required by the law of the State."
Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, 562 (1913). See Atherton v. Atherton,
181 U. S. 155 (1900) ; Hammond v. Hammond, 103 App. Div. 437, 93 N. Y.
Supp. 1 (1st Dep't 1905).
67 "It is objected, however, that if such divorces must be given full faith
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effect that "such an objection goes to the application of the full faith
and credit clause to many situations" 48 assumes doubtful conviction in
the face of attack on the ground that marriage and divorce have been
the subject of special scrutiny and care by states due to the particular
relationships therein involved.
HELEN DANUFF.
THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The phrase res ipsa loquitur-the thing speaks for itself-was
used for the first time in the English Court of Exchequer in 1863.1
In the case of Byrne v. Boadle 2 the plaintiff, while walking along a
public street, was struck by a barrel of flour falling from a window
above. Said Pollock, C. B.: ". . . there are many accidents from
which no presumption of negligence can arise." But on the facts the
court held the occurrence would afford "prima facie evidence of negli-
gence". Thereafter a number of cases under the rule came up in
England and Canada.3 The doctrine was adopted and spread in the
United States in the beginning of the 19th century, where it expanded
in most jurisdictions. The first res ipsa case in New York was
Hogan v. Maihattan Ry.4 This rule now plays an important role in
the law of torts and evidence. 5 However, it has been the source of
much confusion in the courts as well as in the writings on the subject.6
The situation is, as follows: An instrumentality, in the exclusive
possession and management of the defendant or his servants, produces
harm to the plaintiff. Furthermore, such an accident would not
and credit, a substantial dilution of the sovereignty of other states will be
effected, for it is pointed out that under such a rule one state's policy of strict
control over the institution of marriage could be thwarted by the decree of a
more lax state." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 189, 63
Sup. Ct. 207, 215 (1942).
48 Ibid.
I HARPER, TORTS (1937) 182; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 293.
22 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863). See also Scott v.
London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596 (Exch. Chamb. 1865),
159 Eng. Rep. 665 (a classic) (Plaintiff, an officer of the Customs, whilst in
the discharge of his duty, was passing in front of defendant's warehouse; six
bags of sugar fell upon him).
3 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2509.
4 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896) (An iron bar from defendant's struc-
ture hurt the plaintiff while driving along defendant's elevated railway). See
also Griffin v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901) (Passenger rode on
elevator and was killed by falling weights).
5 W xIGoRo, p. cit. supra note 3, at 378.
6 Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928)
22 I.. L. REv. 724; Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1934) 1
U. OF CH. L. REV. 519; Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res rpsa Loquitur(1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 241.
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